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Labour Migration: a historical perspective For
many centuries, states have tried to limit the movement of their people.
Before the twentieth century, the main form that regulation took lay in
attempts to stop the movement between the countryside and the towns. As
far back as the sixteenth century, laws were in place to prevent artisans
moving from the land to the towns in search of higher wages. Before 1900,
however, there was very little sense that the state should act to prevent
people moving across borders. Many professions were mobile, including
sailors, dockers, tailors and weavers. In large towns and cities, there
were often centres inhabited by people from many different backgrounds.
There ways in which the state discriminated against minorities, most
notably on grounds of religion, but there was no idea that people were
born into any one particular nationality, and neither that the state
existed to prevent people from one country moving and settling on the land
of another. Before
1900, there were no immigration controls in Britain. When attempts were
made to prevent people born outside Britain from settling, these plans
were rejected. Between 1800 and 1900, a number of migrants were able to
settle in Britain. They included bomb-plotters, anarchists, and
revolutionaries of many different stripes, from Karl Marx to Prince
Kropotkin. Not one of these foreigners was deported. Tens of thousands of
Jews arrived, many of them poor, fleeing persecution in Eastern Europe.
Not one was subject to anything like our modern system of labour control. The
constitutional theorist Erskine May justified Britain's liberal policy at
the time, 'It has been a proud tradition for England to afford an
inviolable asylum to men of every rank and condition, seeking refuge on
her shores, from persecution and danger in their own lands.'[i]
A laissez-faire attitude towards migration was seen as the best
counterpart to the national policy of free trade. Britain was the world's
greatest merchant power. A world without tariffs was one that her goods
would dominate. What was true for economics was true also for politics.
Free movement was seen to create prosperity. Foreigners were treated as
free to enter the country, to work and to stay.
When
anti-immigrant legislation was suggested, it was defeated. In 1855, an
alliance of former supporters of the People's Charter helped to block a
proposed anti-asylum Bill aimed at excluding foreign dissidents, including
the prominent Hungarian nationalist Louis Kossuth. The former Chartist
George Julian Harney warned in the press that any such plans would be met
with massive pro-refugee demonstrations in the great cities.[ii]
The first
immigration controls were the Aliens Restriction Act of 1905. Immigration
officers acquired the power to question migrants at ports. The Act banned
entry to ships carrying illegal immigrants. It stated that aliens
convicted of offences would be liable to deportation, as would any
foreigners entering the country without means of support. A still harsher
Aliens Restriction Act was passed following the outbreak of war in 1914.
These restrictions were contentious at the time, and unpopular in many
quarters.
The
police did attempt to make use of their powers under the Act. In 1919, for
example, there were sustained race riots on South Shields. They began with
attempts by white sailors to prevent ships from taking on Arab crews. At
this time, there were about 600 Yemeni seamen living in the town. Groups
of white sailors besieged them in their homes. The police and then the
Army were called in, not to halt the pogroms, but to complete them. Twelve
Yemenis were deported in 1919.[iii]
Another 100 were deported in 1922, subject to Aliens Immigration orders.
Another 300 left voluntarily. Yet by 1930, the black community had
re-established itself, and was actually larger than it had been 10 years
earlier, 800 rather than 600 people.[iv]
The Aliens Restriction Act was not just discriminatory; it was also
unworkable. Labour
Migration: the post-war experience The
contemporary discussion of labour migration is dominated by events since
1945, especially the immigration of black workers from the British
Commonwealth in the conditions of post-war boom. The migrants that
travelled to Britain in the late 1940s and early 1950s gained from a tight
labour market. Britain needed workers from abroad.
Such discussion as there was in Parliament focussed on the possible
relaxation of anti-alien laws. One Conservative spokesman Peter
Thorneycroft complained in the Commons of the Labour government's failure
to encourage migrants to arrive in larger numbers, 'The fact is that with
a shortage of manpower in this country every kind of administrative and
bureaucratic difficulty is put in the way of the volunteer who tries to
get into this country to work.' Jim Callaghan replied for Labour, and in
similar terms. 'In a few years, we will be faced with a shortage of
labour, not with a shortage of jobs. We ought now to become a country
where immigrants are welcomed ... who is going to pay for the old-age
pensions and social services unless we have an addition to the population,
which only immigration can provide in the years to come?'[v] The
first beneficiaries of the atmosphere of welcome were a number of European
Volunteer Workers (EVWs). The label was applied retrospectively to 120,000
Polish soldiers who had fought with Britain against Germany, and to 90,000
further volunteers from the Ukraine, Poland, Latvia and Yugoslavia.[vi]
The historian J. A. Tannahill wrote in 1958 that 'after nearly ten years,
the bulk of EVWs are still employed in jobs, where demand for labour far
exceeds supply.' The main areas of employment were mining, bricklaying,
textiles and hospitals. To quote Tannahill again, 'This work has
contributed much more to the country's economic prosperity than the
numbers would suggest.'[vii]
In some places, the EVWs were subject to local terms of employment that
bound them to working for a single employer for many years. No laws were
introduced to facilitate such schemes of bonded labour. When civil
servants discussed which department should monitor the success of this
labour migration scheme, they had some difficulty knowing even which
government department was responsible for these workers. Effectively, they
were allowed to join the labour market on equal terms to any other person. The
European Volunteer Workers were accompanied by a second wave of arrivals,
some 100,000 Irish who came to England between 1945 and 1951. They were
then followed by a third group of migrants from the Commonwealth. The
presence of this new generation was symbolised by the arrival in London of
the Empire Windrush in 1948.[viii]
Both groups were then left free to find work where they could: true, there
was little government support, but more positively, neither was there any
compulsion. Through
the 1940s, both the Labour government and the opposition accepted the need
for immigration. After 1951, the incoming Conservative government was
helped by the fact that all citizens of British dominions had British
citizenship. One Conservative minister explained the willingness to accept
Commonwealth migrants, 'It was not due to a deliberate act of policy
formally announced and embodied in our law. It is not even a policy which
gradually grew up and became established by custom ... It is simply a fact
which we have taken for granted from the earliest days in which our
forebears ventured forth across the seas.'[ix]
The citizenship rights of British subjects had never previously been
subject to any process of debate. Before 1945, few people from India or
the West Indies had the funds for travel. The idea that all British
subjects should receive equal treatment was the logical corollary of the
civilising mission claimed for British imperial rule. The principle was
also enshrined in the 1948 Nationality Act. Business
also extended its own welcome to the new arrivals. One typical piece
appeared in the Voice of North East
Industry. 'If the North East's plans for continued economic growth are
[to be] realised, wrote, J. E. T. Aldridge, 'then it can be expected that
greater numbers of immigrants will make their way here.' Migrants should
be welcomed. 'Any conception of other racial groups being inherently
inferior in intelligence to our own is unfounded ... Coloured workers are
quite as trainable as other workers ... As with white workers, aptitudes
and application to the work situation will vary with the individual.' The
language may appear patronising to present-day audiences, but we should
recognise the intention as positive.[x] The
advantages of welcoming the new arrivals were clear. Many migrants had
been educated in British-style schools. The majority spoke English and
exhibited a positive even in some cases idealised conception of British
democracy. The migrants identified strongly with Britain and her
civilising mission in the world. One anecdote will suffice. Pindi Naroo
grew up in Kenya in the 1940s. His older brother won a scholarship to
study in England and completed his medical decree at Durham. On his
brother's return to Kenya, 'The entire school came out with a Union Jack
to welcome him. You see it was an honour to go to Britain for higher
education.'[xi] At
least until the end of the 1950s, British immigration practice remained
liberal. This was the period when black and Asian settlers first began to
arrive and live in London, the West Midlands, Yorkshire and the North
West. A discreet contract was at work, its terms unspoken but known.
People from the West Indies, Pakistan and India were allowed into Britain.
In return they were asked to do the unskilled jobs that most white workers
rejected. As long as the economy continued to grow, the state and most
British people continued to respect the right of new arrivals to settle. The
terms of this 'arrangement' were of course always unfair, and flawed even
on their own terms. For the migrants who came were the best of their home
country's youth. Fired with ambition, it seemed extraordinary to them,
that they were now expected to work in menial trades. Om Middha came to
Britain, aged 24, and a former colonial policeman, having already been
awarded the highest medal for gallantry open to members of his career: In
England, my first job was in a glass factory. That was in 1954. At that
time, I was asked to do nothing more exhilarating than carrying boxes of
tools. In India I was used to servants making tea, in England it became my
job. It was a strange induction but eventually I left and found a job
working in a railway office. The change of life-style was educational, but
I was not deterred for I saw this merely as a setback. To qualify as a
barrister I had to have an A level in Latin. In my spare time I studied
this and also French at night school.[xii] Stop-go
intervention The
first turning point came in 1962, with the passing of the Commonwealth
Immigrants Act. All Commonwealth citizens became subject to immigration
control for the first time, except persons born in the United Kingdom,
holders of passports issued by the UK government and their descendants.[xiii]
According to A. Sivanandan of the Institute of Race Relations, 'Racialism
was no longer a matter of free enterprise; it was nationalised. If labour
from the "coloured" Commonwealth and colonies was still needed,
its intake and its deployment was going to be regulated not by the market
forces of discrimination but by the regulatory instruments of the state
itself.'[xiv] Why
then did the law change? The Conservative argument, put at the time, was
that the people of Britain had woken up to the threat of mass migration.
Rather than endure decades of further black migration, they chose to
insist on a halt. In the words of Tory MP Cyril Osborne, 'If unlimited
immigration were allowed, we should ultimately become a chocolate-coloured
Afro-Asian mixed society. That I do not want.'[xv] Yet such an 'explanation'
can hardly do justice to the complete summersault that took place in
British migration policy. Before 1962, politicians and business leaders
were by and large united in the defence of the idea of bringing migrants
to Britain. Even individuals who would later be associated with the
arguments for controls, were at this stage welcoming. The Minister for
Health, one Enoch Powell, campaigned to bring nurses from India and the
West Indies to Britain.[xvi]
After 1962, Britain entered into a new period of control. Between 1950 and
1962 there was no great evidence that popular attitudes of hostility were
indeed stronger than attitudes of welcome. Public opinion did shift, but
later, and in response to a change that was signalled at the top of
society.[xvii] 'Throughout
the 1950s', writes one commentator Ruth Brown, 'labour shortage was still
seen as the main problem for British industries most vulnerable to the
"stop-go" cycle, like the car industry ... So in the 1950s the
Tory cabinet voted by big majorities against immigration controls.' Yet by
the 1960s, almost 'no MP in the Commons would speak out openly in favour
of unrestricted immigration and by the mid-to late 1960s levels of
immigration form the Commonwealth were down to virtually zero as a result
of government legislation.' Brown's explains the shift as a collective
political response to the changed economic circumstances of the 1960s.
'Newly arrived black and Asian workers from the Commonwealth proved to be
the perfect scapegoats for the troubles which the Tories now faced.'[xviii] Even
after 1962, it was not obvious that British law would remain indefinitely
closed. This only became clear following the general election of 1964.
After thirteen years in power, the Conservatives were facing defeat. In
most areas, they responded pragmatically, with candidates trying to draw
attention to local issues, and disassociate themselves from the tired
Cabinet. Peter
Griffiths, the Conservative candidate for Smethwick in the West Midlands,
accused black workers of bringing leprosy to Britain. His campaign
literature included the slogan, 'If you want a Nigger for a neighbour,
vote Labour.' The leaders of the Conservative Party viewed Griffiths with
disdain, but did nothing concrete to discipline him for such aggressive
racism. Voters concluded that no one 'really' disagreed with Griffiths. In
the 1964 election, Labour gained ground all over Britain. There were only
26 seats were Conservatives took votes from Labour. In 25 of them, the
swing to the Tories was less than 3.5 per cent. There was only one
constituency where the Conservative vote increased substantially. In
Smethwick, Griffiths' vote rose by 7.2 percent.[xix]
His campaign became a model for his party. After
1964, both Labour and Conservatives were converted to a policy of
tightened controls. It became one of those policies like crime where
increased action was always necessary, irrespective of the real situation
on the ground. The 1964 British Nationality Act preserved the right to
resume UK citizenship for white settlers in Africa, while excluding black
Africans. Labour's 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act extended this
distinction to cover the whole Commonwealth. Ancestral connection became
the key factor in determining which citizens were subject to immigration
control. The rationale was that white immigrants might possess such an
ancestral connection, a white British grandparent, while black people
would not.[xx] Among
Labour circles, there was still some unease towards immigration controls.
Anti-racist laws were needed therefore to restore the balance. Legislation
followed including the 1976 Race Relations Act and the 2002 Race Relations
Amendment Act. The former outlawed direct discrimination on grounds of
race. The latter has extended particular protection to public sector
workers. Governments acted to combat racism and institutional racism,
discrimination which was most often aimed at workers who were themselves
migrants or the children of migrants. But with anti-discrimination laws in
place to protect existing black British citizens, controls were again
tightened to prevent new migrants from arriving. Roy Hattersley MP spoke
in Parliament of the need to accept further immigration controls. He began
by explaining that in 1961 he had opposed controls, but by 1965 he had
learned to support them. 'I come now to the melancholy view that ... we
must impose a test which tries to analyse which immigrants, as well as
having jobs, or special skills, are most likely to be assimilated into our
national life.'[xxi] Hattersley's speech was
adopted in mantra form: no control without assimilation, no assimilation
without control. The
1971 Immigration Act brought direct migration to an end. It distinguished
between 'patrials' and 'non-patrials'. Patrials were defined as people who
were born in the United Kingdom or who had a parent (or grandparent, in
the case of British citizens) who had been born or naturalised in the
United Kingdom; or British or Commonwealth citizens who had lived in the
United Kingdom for five years and had applied to register as a British
citizen. Patrials continued to enjoy free entry. The idea was to
facilitate the entry of the Australian- or South African-born children of
while English emigrants, while blocking arrivals from the West Indies,
India or Pakistan. The
Colour Bar It
has often been assumed that the purpose of immigration controls was
primarily to restrict the entry of migrants. If this was the goal, then
the controls must be deemed a failure. After each new law, new migrants
have arrived. The strong controls may even have increased the numbers
arriving. According to Yasmin Alibhai-Brown. 'Most migrants don't wish to
die in foreign places even if they manage to acquire that semi in Harrow
or a car they could only have dreamed of in Ethiopia or Malawi. I believe
that had we not had a series of lock-out immigration policies since 1968,
many settled immigrants would have chosen to go back, as long as they had
a safety net: the chance to return here for economic reasons ... Hence the
paradox: the immigration laws themselves have created a larger immigrant
population.'[xxii] Controls
may not have reduced the numbers settling, but if their point was in fact
to guide public opinion, to show that something 'tough' was being done,
they have been a success. They have sent out a signal that the government
had been persuaded of the truth of the anti-immigrant campaign. Whenever
race returned to the political agenda, the press called for further
restrictions to take the heat out of anti-immigrant prejudice. Wild
speculations were made about the numbers of black people entering Britain.
Yet despite considerable monitoring of suspected 'aliens', the numbers
found were small: just 394 illegal immigrants in 1976, 809 in 1977 and so
on.[xxiii]
Each
time that black people were attacked, the solution offered was to keep
further migrants out. The victims were blamed for racism, as in Margaret
Thatcher's 1978 television interview, 'People are really rather afraid',
she claimed, 'that this country might be swamped by people of different
cultures.'[xxiv]
The speech was also a revealing instance of the process whereby hostility
began at the state level and then spread down. In its aftermath, the
numbers of people telling pollsters that they believed racism was 'an
urgent issue facing the community' rose from 9 to 21 percent.[xxv]
The state
has taken on new powers to limit the access of migrants to the labour
market. The ultimate weapon has always been the threat of deportation. In
December 1977, Northumbria police arrested thirty Bangladeshis following
raids on Indian restaurants in Newcastle. The men were accused of having
come to Britain illegally, and of working without permits. The police then
spoke to the press, boasting of the success of the raids in deterring
future migration. Five men were even named in the papers as 'illegal'
overstayers.[xxvi] It happened that not one
of these supposed 'illegal immigrants' did in fact lack legal papers. The
men accused of breaking residence laws were all freed. The last of them
Rupa Ali was held without trial in Durham Prison for forty-five days,
before being released uncharged.[xxvii]
While his arrest had been treated as front-page news, the story that he
had in fact been the victim of a terrible injustice went almost
unreported. Redefining
persecution In
the past ten years, the most visible group of new migrants have been
refugees, travelling to Britain from dictatorships or countries at war.
The legal situation facing refugees has been consistently hostile. The
numbers rose at a time when the
two main forms of post-war migration had been largely closed: labour
migration and the migration of dependents. The authorities claimed that
refugees were escaping through a legal loophole, refugees responded that
they were merely claiming the rights that were theirs. Prior to the 1990s,
refugees had indeed enjoyed some protection in law.[xxviii]
The right to escape from persecution is enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,[xxix] and the right to settle
in the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention. There are reasons why law
should offer greater sympathy to 'political' rather than 'economic'
migrants. The most important is the memory of the 1930s. At the very
moment that Hitler began his persecution of the Jews, the European powers
responded with restrictions on refugees. Ministers complained that they
did not want to over-burden their country with too many foreigners. The
failure of these politicians to react with sympathy was then remembered
with shame after 1945, and democrats everywhere promised not to make the
same mistakes again. The
1993 Immigration and Asylum Act brought in new rules for immigration
decisions. Refugees' rights to benefit were first restricted in 1996. The
1999 Immigration and Asylum Act authorised the removal of refugees and
other migrants to third countries and the deportation of overstayers.
Section 7 of the 2002 Nationality,
Immigration and Asylum Act denied any benefits to refugees who did not
claim asylum within hours of their arrival: within a year up to 15,000
refugees were living destitute.[xxx]
New
laws have made it illegal for refugees to work while their case was being
heard, replaced cash benefits with vouchers, and then denied many refugees
any access to welfare at all. People fleeing from persecution were not
even allowed the dignity of the label 'refugee'. This word was replaced
with the more cynical tag, 'asylum seeker', which suggested that until the
government had decided whether people were genuine or not, it was to
assume that their application was false. Large numbers of refugees were
jailed on arrival, in camps such as the Campsfield detention centre near
Oxford, or in Her Majesty's Prisons, Haslar, Lindholme and Rochester, at
Belmarsh, Bullingdon, Highdown, Holloway, Holme House, Lincoln, Liverpool,
Wandsworth and Winchester. Refugees were also held in prison on Teesside.
Before
spring 2000, refugees were free on arrival to settle anywhere in Britain.
After April 2000, that choice too was removed. Failure to leave their home
on demand, resulted in the refugee concerned being reclassified as
intentionally homeless. All benefits were stopped. Britain was much
tougher than other countries. In 1997, the UK granted asylum to just 19
percent of people who applied from Afghanistan. In Canada over the same
period, 97 percent of Afghanis were accepted. Somali applicants had a 92
percent success rate in Canada, while in the United Kingdom the rate was
only 34 percent. Eight-five percent of Colombian asylum applicants
received protection in Canada, compared to just 3 percent in Britain.[xxxi]
The most
important barrier blocking the integration of refugees into British life
has been the existence of laws preventing asylum seekers from working. Between
1986 and 2002, an asylum applicant could request permission to work if
their application for asylum had not been processed. Following the 2002 Nationality,
Immigration and Asylum Act, this route was closed. The
former Home Secretary David Blunkett criticised newspapers such as the Sun
for encouraging hostility towards asylum seekers, but the emotive
practice of pitting refugees and other welfare recipients in competition
with each other was one that began with his own 2002 Act. Limiting
the freedom to work The
law has responded to the ways in which people have settled in Britain. At
first, people simply moved and later looked for work. The 1905 Act was
designed to close off that route. Later, most migrants were British
citizens from the Commonwealth. The 1962, 1964 and 1971 Acts redefined
them not as British citizens, but as various other classes of subject,
without the same rights to live in Britain and settle. The 1993, 1999,
2002 and 2004 Acts have limited the rights of refugees and asylum seekers.
Yet employers in Britain have continued to argue that some forms of labour
migration should be allowed. Caught between the incompatible pressures to
allow and to restrict, the government has introduced an extraordinary
range of intermediate schemes, which enable some migrants to work, while
restricting the conditions under which they can be employed. Examples of
these policies discussed in subsequent chapters include: the working
holidaymakers scheme, the restrictions on the employment of citizens from
the European Union accession states, work permit schemes such as the Highly
Skilled Migrants Programme, the Seasonal
Agricultural Workers’ Scheme and the ‘sectors-based schemes’ (SBS)
in food processing and hospitality.
The re-politicisation
of race and migration, which has taken place in Britain since 1997, has
had a direct effect not just on refugee and asylum policy, but also on the
treatment of many other categories of migrants, including workers living
in Britain under the work permit schemes. Thus the anti-black and
anti-Muslim riots that were witnessed in towns such as Oldham in 2001 have
opened up a space for other forms of violent xenophobia, such as the riots
against Portuguese workers living in Thetford, who were attacked by a mob
of several hundred people following England's defeat at Euro 2004.
Similarly, the proliferation of anti-asylum legislation has tended to lead
also to a toughening of labour migration policy, including charges for
workers applying for immigration employment documents, and the
registration scheme for workers from the EU accession states.
Faced
with the extraordinary complexity of different employment schemes, many
employers have resorted to illicit practices of recruiting workers who
have lacked proper legal standing. The death of 23 Chinese cockle-pickers
at Morecombe Bay in February 2004 illustrated the reality of life for many
migrant workers. They have been forced to work in a parallel economy, paid
often below the minimum wage, working anti-social hours, longer than those
that anyone else would tolerate, and often without the normal protection
of healthy and safety laws. Those who have protested have often been
sacked. Their work was illegal. They have had no rights.
As
greater numbers of labour migrants have been employed in an increasing
variety of complex and incompatible schemes, so the numbers of illegal
residents and illegal workers have also inevitably risen. Arm in arm with
an increasing number of asylum refusals, this process has in turn
encouraged the practice of forced deportation of migrants from Britain. As
recently as 1975, just 378 people were removed in this way. Since then,
the numbers have risen continuously, to 736 in 1977 and 946 in 1981.[xxxii]
There were 23,460 deportations in 1990 and they remained at roughly this
level until 1996. The figures increased sharply after the 1997 election,
rising to 34,775 in 1998, 46,635 in 2000 and an astonishing 65,460 in
2002.[xxxiii]
In sixty
years, migration law has been transformed. Where previously, policy was
tolerant, it has become more rigid and authoritarian. There is an urgent
need to halt and even reverse this process. Interwar Europe presents with
many negative examples of societies, which turned away from liberalism,
and having been cut adrift, knew no way to return.
[i] P. Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics (London: Penguin, 1965), p. 83. [ii] E. H. Haraszti, Kossuth: Hungarian Patriot in Britain (Budapest: Lorvina Books, 1994), p. 88. [iii] H. Ansari, 'The Infidel Within'; Muslims in Britain since 1800 (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), p. 97; P. Fryer, Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain (London: Pluto, 1984), p. 299. [iv] R. I. Lawless, 'Muslim Migration to the North East of England during the early Twentieth Century', Cleveland History 70 (1996), pp. 2-21, here 16; also R. Lawless, From Ta'izz to Tyneside: An Arab Community in the North East of England during the Early Twentieth Century (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995). [v] Foot, Immigration and Race, pp. 116-7. [vi] J. Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1993); D. Kay and R. Miles, Refugees or Migrant Workers? European Volunteer Workers in Britain 1946-1951 (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 59 [vii] J. A. Tannahill, European Volunteer Workers in Britain (Manchester: MUP, 1958), p. 116. [viii] K. Lunn, 'The British State and Immigration, 1945-51: New Light on the Empire Windrush', in T. Kushner and K. Lunn (eds), The Politics of Marginality: Race, The Radical Right and Minorities in Twentieth Century Britain (London: Cass, 1990), pp. 161-74. [ix] Foot, Immigration and Race, p. 125. [x] J. E. T. Eldridge, 'Workers with different coloured skins', Voice of North East Industry, December 1964. [xi] P. Rao and B. Lewis, Desh Videsh: Home and Abroad (South Shields: Hindu Nari Singh, 2003), p. 33. [xii] Rao and Lewis, Desh Videsh, p. 25 [xiii] I. A. MacDonald and F. Webber, Immigration Law and Practice in the United Kingdom (London: Butterworth's, 2001 edn), p. 4. [xiv] A. Sivanandan, A Different Hunger: Writings on Black Resistance (London: Pluto, 1982), p. 12. [xv] P. Alexander, Racism, Resistance and Revolution (London: Bookmarks, 1987), p. 31. [xvi] R. Brown, 'Racism and immigration controls', International Socialism 68 (1995), pp. 3-36, 11. [xvii] Alexander, Racism, Resistance, pp. 37-9 [xviii] Brown, 'Racism and immigration controls', pp. 18-19. [xix] Foot, Immigration and Race, pp. 148-9. [xx] MacDonald and Webber, Immigration Law and Practice, p. 4. [xxi] S. Patterson, Immigration and Race Relations in Britain 1960-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press and Institute of Race Relations, 1969), p. 109. [xxii] Y. Alibhai-Brown, Independent, 2 December 2002. [xxiii] Home Office, Statistical Bulletin, February 1979, p. 5. [xxiv] R. Witte, Racist Violence and the State (London: Longman, 1996), p. 53. [xxv] S. Spencer, 'The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations in Britain: A Developing Agenda', in T. Blackstone, Race Relations in Britain: A Developing Agenda (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 74-95, 80. [xxvi] 'Police quiz six after dawn raids', Newcastle Journal, 7 December 1977. [xxvii] 'Rally Hits at Racialism', Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 23 January 1978. [xxviii] MacDonald and Webber, Immigration Law and Practice, p. 2. [xxix] S. Benhabib, 'The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens', paper presented to conference on 'Migrants, Nations and Citizenship', Cambridge, 5-7 July 2004, p. 7. [xxx] M. Taylor, 'Asylum policies "make 10,000 people destitute a year"', Guardian, 9 February 2004. [xxxi] Refugee Council, 'Nailing press myths about refugees', press release, December 2002. [xxxii] New Society Database (London: New Society, 1986), p. 15. [xxxiii] National Coalition of Anti-Deportation Campaigns, News Service, 29 September 2003.
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